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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Stock-Conflict of Owners-hip
In Bata v. Bata, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judg-
ment of the court below in the adjudication of conflicting claims
to shares of stock of a Czech business enterprise deposited in a
New York safe deposit box. It was determined that the plaintiffs,
statutory heirs of a wealthy Czech industrialist, had the "better
right" to the shares in suit which defendant, half brother of dece-
dent, claimed by virtue of an alleged contract of sale and estoppel.
That the New York court had obtained jurisdiction had been pre-
viously established over defendant's objection thereto on the
ground of forum *an conveniens.48  Under the law of Czecho-
slovakia, the alleged contract between defendant and decedent, of
which there was signification in decedent's will, was held invalid,
and all of decedent's property, subject to certain debt and legacy
payments, devolved upon the plaintiffs, his heirs, via intestacy.
Further, the courts below determined that defendant had not estab-
lished either constructive or actual possession of the shares of
stock in question by virtue of plaintiffs' past conduct, and hence
the latter were not estopped from claiming their right to the
shares as property included in the estate which they inherited.
Inasmuch as it appeared from the evidence that there was some
,factual basis for this determination, the Court of Appeals was
precluded from finding otherwise.49
C. Trusts and Future Interests
Disposition of Corpus to Life. Beneficiary
a. Duty to account: A testamentary gift of personal prop-
erty for life with a remainder to others, in effect constitutes the
life tenant a trustee of the principal fund for the benefit of the
remaindermen.5 0 Hence he has no right to invade the principal
fund, but is to have only the income for himself, and must account
as a trustee to the remaindermen.r' If he fails to account, any
doubts as to his use of the fund are to be resolved against him. "
In a recent case, 53 personal property had been given to a
tenant for life with remainder to such of his children as he might
47. 306 N.Y. 96. 115 N.E. 2d 672 (1953).
48. Bata v. Bata, 304 N.Y. 51, 105 N.E. 2d 623 (1952) ; see 2 Bno. L. REV. 73
(1952).
49. See Matter of Kaplan, 284 N.Y. 584, 63 N.E. 2d 337 (1945).
50. Matter of Von Kleist, 265 N.Y. 422, 193 N.E. 256 (1934) ; Matter of Deton,
102 N.Y. 200 6 N.,E. 256 (1886).
51. Surrogate's Court Act §261-a applies the statutory provisions relating to
trustees to legal life tenants.
52. White v. Rankin, 18 App. Div. 293, 46 N.Y. Supp. 228 (1897), aff'd, 162
N.Y. 622, 57 N.E. 1128 (1900); 4 BoaRT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §962 (1948).
53. In re Reckford's Will, 307 N.Y. 165, 120 N.E. 2d 696 (1954).
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appoint by will. The life tenant so appointed a son who died two
months after he did. Large amounts of the property had dis-
appeared, and there was no evidence that the life tenant had ever
accounted to the deceased remainderman.
The Court of Appeals refused (5-2) to surcharge the balance
of the life tenant's estate with the value of the missing personalty
because of a lack of evidence that he did not account.
Ignoring the fact that the remainderman was unascertained
until the death of the life tenant, the court pointed out that the son
may have impliedly consented to his father's invasion of the prin-
cipal and hence both he and his estate would be estopped from
later objecting."
An affidavit concerning the life tenant's periodic destruction
of records was considered to be of insufficient weight to raise the
presumption against the fiduciary who fails to account. As the
burden of proving that there had been no accounting, formal,
informal, or implied, is on the remainderman,55 the total -lack of
evidence required a judgment for the life tenant's estate.
The dissent maintained that the complete disappearance of
the personalty was sufficient evidence to shift the burden of prov-
ing a proper use of the fund to the father's estate.
b. Discretion of trustee: The Court of Appeals has pre-
viously held that a testator may create a trust -which grants to
the beneficiary an absolute power to terminate the trust by de-
manding and receiving the corpus from the trustee. 6 Similarly
sweeping power was found to be invested in the testamentary
trustee in In re Bisconti's Estate 7 Testatrix directed that in-
come of a trust be paid to her daughter for life and authorized
trustees to invade principal "as in their sole and uncontrolled
discretion they may deem wise, whether because of insufficiency of
income personal need or otherwise." The trustee forthwith re-
quested authority to deliver the corpus to the life beneficiary.
The objections of the special guardian of three remaindermen,
grandchildren of the testatrix by another child, sustained by the
lower courts, were rejected.
54. As where the cestui knows of the method employed by the trustee and fails
to object immediately. 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4 § 962.
55. Owen v. Blumenthal, 280 N.Y. 96, 19 N.E. 2d 977 (1939).
56. Matter of Wollard, 295 N. Y. 390, 68 N.E. 2d 1816 (1946). A trust was
established to pay the income to the testator's wife "together with as much of the
principal or corpus . . . as she may deem necessary for her maintenance comfort and
well being." The court held that under the terms of the will the trustees could not
question the good faith and honest judgment of a request for principal by the beneficiary.
57. 306 N.Y. 442, 119 N.E. 2d 34 (1954).
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The decisions below were predicated upon the application of
the canon of construction known as ejusdem generis. This court,
examining the words of the bequest, found an intent so clearly
expressed as not to permit the application of any rules of construc-
tion.6 8 The word "whether," following words of an essentially
negative character, excluding all control over the trustees, elim-
inated any restriction on their judgment and rendered the special
items enumerated words of description only-the words "or other-
wise" being another and more general descriptive category. The
inclusive character of the prior terms evidenced an intent that
the words "or otherwise" was a term of enlargement to include
every conceivable situation outside those stated.
The court necessarily finding that the testatrix contemplated
and in fact provided for such a contingency, the trust was allowed
to be destroyed before it was ever actually in existence. Such an
intention seems extremely doubtful, and it would appear that the
decision encroaches upon the principle that a court may intervene
in the administration of a trust when it appears that the trustee no
matter how broad the discretion bestowed upon him, is so admin-
istering his trust that it fails to accomplish the purpose for which
it was created.5 9 The effect of the decision may well be qualified
by a careful application by the lower courts of the principle in-
volved. Recent decisions6" indicate that this has been the fate of
Matter of Wollard, 1 and a like treatment is appropriate in this
instance.
Power of Sale
Where a trustee is given the power to sell real property or
other trust property the courts by interpretation determine
whether the power ceases or survives the termination of the
trust.6 2 The general rule is that if the tenor of a will does not
limit the power of sale expressly or impliedly upon the trust term,
the power is deemed to continue unaffected even though the title
to the trust res passes to the beneficiaries.6 3
58. Matter of Watson's Will, 262 N.Y. 284, 186 N.E. 787 (1933); Matter of
Rollin 's Will, 271 App. Div. 982, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 116 (2d Dep't 1947), aff'd, 297 N.
612, 75 N.E. 2d 627 (1947), 1 DAvIDs' NEV YORK LAW oF WILLS § 491 (1924).
59. Matter of Vandecar, 49 Misc. 39, 98 N.Y. Supp. 309 (Surr. Ct. 1905). But
see Corkery v. Dorsey, 223 Mass. 97, 111 N.E. 795, 796 (1916).
60. Matter of Britt, 272 App. Div. 426, 71 N.Y. S. 2d 405 (3d Dep't 1947);
Matter of Hart, 189 Misc. 171, 71 N.Y. S. 2d 488 (Surr. Ct. 1947) ; Matter of Cass,
68 N.Y. S. 2d 666 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
61. Supra note 1.
62. 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS, 1890, 1891 (1939).
63. Cussack v. Tweedy, 126 N.Y. 81, 26 N.E. 1033 (1891); Hutkoff v. Winmar
Realty Co., 211 App. Div. 726, 208 N.Y. Supp. 25 (lst Dep't 1925).
